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Will Nuclear Weapon Tests Be Curbed?

by William R. Frye

UNITED NATIONS—International pressure continues to build up for either prohibition or limitation of nuclear-weapons tests. One by one, nuclear scientists, geneticists and other competent specialists are disputing what is still the majority view, at least in the United States and Britain—namely, that “properly conducted” nuclear tests at their present rate of frequency do not constitute a hazard to human health and safety.

India, which has been in the vanguard of prohibition efforts for more than two years, has now published a 184-page governmental study entitled *Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects*, the conclusion of which is that the “magnitude of the harm” is not clear but is more likely to be underrated than overrated, and that mankind should not wait until it is “certain” there is a danger before protecting itself.

The humanitarian argument is not the only basis for the prohibition demand. There is also what might be called a strategic argument—namely, that an enforced ban on A-bomb and H-bomb testing would help to dissuade “fourth” countries—countries other than the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain—

from building such weapons. An untested bomb is a hazardous weapon to use against an enemy capable of nuclear retaliation; if it did not go off, and destroy the enemy’s capacity for counterattack, the consequences would be catastrophic for the aggressor. Many countries, knowing they could not legally make certain their bombs were useable, might hesitate to undertake the huge investment of time, money and skilled manpower necessary for a bomb program.

Nothing short of an enforced prohibition of bomb manufacture could provide full assurance; but a test ban might be the decisive deterrent in cases such as France, and perhaps Sweden, where governmental leaders are divided and the decision could easily go either way.

The U.S.S.R. has long professed to favor a limitation or prohibition of nuclear testing. Sometimes (as on March 27, 1956) the Kremlin has suggested banning merely H-bomb blasts while permitting lesser explosions to continue; at other times (as on July 16, 1956 and in earlier comprehensive disarmament plans) it was the testing of all nuclear weapons that the Russians said they wanted to halt.

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Both at London last spring and in New York this July Andrei Gromyko said, almost in so many words, that it was in the national interest of the Soviet Union to continue its tests and that he was proposing to halt them only because of the pressure of world opinion. With some Soviet explosions taking place just north of the Indian subcontinent, in Soviet Central Asia, the Kremlin might well wish to make it appear that the West was responsible for their continuance. Otherwise fallout, which India's V. K. Krishna Menon said (without identifying its origin) had poisoned pasture lands for Indian cows, might become a source of considerable friction between Moscow and New Delhi. Rather belatedly President Eisenhower began to draw attention to the proximity of these tests to India, in a statement on August 26 regarding the renewal of Russian test explosions.

The United States has been inhibited from exploiting political opportunities of this kind by the necessity of testing its own new weapons. The Pentagon would not let the Administration propose a test ban until our experimentation was complete, or nearly so. There is now, however, considerable evidence that this stage has been reached, that we have done virtually all of the testing we need to do until the time comes to try out intercontinental missiles with live warheads. That was the implication, for example, of a statement by Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the AEC, on completion of the latest test series on July 19.

If so, and if—as seems entirely possible—the Soviet Union has not yet reached this stage, there would be a further impelling reason to halt weapons testing, or at least to curb it drastically. The effect of a test ban is to slow down the progress of weapons technology—that is, the development of new weapons. The race would continue in the laboratories, but both sides would have to run it, as it were, with potato bags around their legs. The side with a lead at the time tests were halted could expect to hold that lead longer than it would in a wholly free race; at least, it would hold its lead unless espionage leakages were too great in the enemy's direction.

Test Bans — and Controls

There would also, of course, be a necessity to guard against secret testing. This may not be a simple task. Present monitoring equipment can detect the evidence of major explosions, but it is not certain that smaller kiloton explosions (that is, explosions below the H-bomb range) could not be hidden. Jules Moch of France has said he believes they might be hidden, for example by holding them under water. And one of the Soviet proving grounds is the Barents Sea, north of Siberia in the Arctic Ocean. Obviously if the United States were to propose a curb on tests, it would have to insist on a control organ, and would want that organ to station men and equipment anywhere it felt necessary, including the Barents Sea and Soviet Central Asia. Significantly, the Russians have tried to mini-

mize the necessity of control, contending that present monitoring equipment would be sufficient. "There is no need for a special control body or organ," said Mr. Gromyko last July.

Several times this summer a proposal to limit the size and number of nuclear tests has gone up through the governmental machinery in Washington and has seemed on the verge of final approval, only to be withheld at the last moment. One difficulty has been that the British wish to set off at least one H-bomb later this year or early next and hence are resisting a limitation on the size of explosions, although London is prepared to limit their number and rate. Another problem is that there are still men in the Pentagon who are not ready to see weapons technology driven wholly into the laboratory. Still another difficulty is the one President Eisenhower mentioned at a press conference last spring—that a ban on H-bomb tests would not have real significance if development of intercontinental missiles, their principal carrier-to-be, continued. It is possible, however, that the Administration will soon come forward with a plan dealing with both missiles and nuclear-weapons tests. The President hinted as much in his latest letter to Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin, and such a plan would make a dramatic campaign document.

Mr. Frye, a member of the staff of *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1941, has been its United Nations correspondent for six years.

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Far East: Brink of War—or of Appeasement?

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told only half the story when in the famous *Life* magazine article he mentioned his ability to “advance to the brink” of war and retire in safety. It is just as possible for the brink of war to advance to him. He may control his own actions, either advancing to the brink or not as he wishes. But he cannot control other peoples’ actions, which may bring the brink close to the United States. In the first instance it is the brink of war; in the second, it can become the brink of appeasement.

It is the second instance that appears to be shaping up in the Far East. Today, in contrast to a year ago, the possibility of war in that area appears to be advancing toward Mr. Dulles—slowly, unobtrusively, but inexorably; and war could engulf him if he does not effect a diplomatic retreat, however impolitic it may appear at this time.

It is advancing because the Chinese Communists have no intention of accepting the *status quo*. Our own officials agree that in North Korea the Chinese Communists have brought in hundreds of combat airplanes contrary to the armistice terms, have built airfields, and have assembled vast quantities of other combat material in direct violation of truce agreements. In Vietnam, they admit the Chinese Communists have ignored the terms of the Geneva agreements of July 21, 1954 and are staging a military build-up in the north; Communist fighting forces in North Vietnam have doubled since the armistice; artillery firepower in the north has increased six times; prohibited combat material has moved in freely; and Peiping has supplied

training and equipment to North Vietnam in defiance of pledges and agreements.

American officials admit, also, that in defiance of the Geneva accords rebels controlled by Communist China have refused to relinquish control of two northern provinces of Laos; that Peiping agents are actively using terror tactics in Thailand; that across the Thai border in Red China a renegade “autonomous Thai state” has been established, with Peiping’s blessing, to induce the peoples of Thailand, Laos and other lands in that area to rebel against their governments.

The same trend exists in the Formosan area. Mr. Dulles may have pulled back from the brink of war there a year ago and with some skill—but in the time since then, the brink has been advancing his way. The Chinese Communists have been busy building up their military strength along the coast. They have been working night and day to complete new airstrips, both on the coast and some ways back, which can have both offensive and defensive advantages. They shot down an American plane on August 22 and fired on others which they claim came too close to the mainland. They have stepped up their artillery strength opposite Quemoy and Matsu. They are waging an increasingly successful propaganda campaign for the allegiance of the nearly 12 million overseas Chinese. They are engaged in a constant campaign of vilification against this country, designed to promote hatred of the United States among Asians. And there is nothing much the United States can do to stop Peiping’s military build-up or

plane incidents off the coast of mainland China as long as it is our policy not to recognize Peiping and thus to bar full-scale negotiations with the Chinese Communists.

Election-Year Problems

One of Washington’s more astute commentators and news analysts, Joseph C. Harsch, writing in the September *Harper’s*, expresses the view that Mr. Dulles has taken more and bolder risks on the brink of appeasement than on the brink of war. Be that as it may, the course of events in the Far East indicates that in a particularly vulnerable area the time approaches when Mr. Dulles may have to decide between military action or appeasement.

As things now stand the Secretary of State and the Eisenhower Administration as a whole are in no mood or position to retreat on any of the Far Eastern diplomatic fronts. They are committed—as are the Democrats—to opposing Peiping’s membership in the UN; they are on the record—as are the Democrats—in opposing United States recognition of Peiping. They are determined to keep America’s newsmen out of Red China even if the newsmen want to go at their own risk.

The entire Far East situation is colored and influenced by the fact that this is an election year and that everyone in Washington is more interested in the approach of election day than in whether a Far East crisis is advancing on us. For that reason one hears little about the advancing brink of war in the Far East. But it is there—and advancing—nonetheless; and Mr. Dulles is keenly aware of it.

NEAL STANFORD



Human Emotions and the Canal

Before the Menzies Committee held its talks with President Gamal Abdel Nasser—which finally ended in stalemate on September 9—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had expressed the hope that the Cairo talks could be focused on such practical arrangements as are necessary for effective service of the Suez Canal to all nations, and that discussion about explosive terms like “nationalism” and “colonialism” or “East against West” might be avoided. The announcement by British Prime Minister Anthony Eden in the House of Commons on September 12 that Britain, France and the United States had agreed to create a Suez Canal operating agency—described as a “users’ association”—which could act without regard to Egypt’s management of the nationalized waterway, glaringly revealed the difficulty of trying to limit to legal and technical arrangements the settlement of a problem which involves profound emotions on all sides of the controversy.

Emotions in Egypt

The Suez Canal crisis was brought about by emotional reactions in Egypt, and in turn produced emotional reactions in the West, particularly Britain and France. Neither of these reactions can be disregarded in attempts to arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement. While President Nasser had apparently been considering nationalization of the canal for some time, British observers believe that his decision to carry out this plan on July 26 was precipitated by the withdrawal on July 19 of the United States offer to provide funds for construction of the High Aswan

Dam—a rejection that, in turn, deprived Cairo of funds promised by Britain and of the World Bank loan, which had been contingent on Anglo-American aid. The action of the United States and Britain, however reasonable it may seem in terms of their own interests and policies, was bound to arouse resentment in Cairo. Nasser’s move, from his point of view, was justified by the hope of using canal revenues for the dam project, which has long been regarded as a first priority in Egypt’s development plans.

“In making this move, Nasser has stressed the concepts of “nationalism” and “sovereignty,” which loom large in the minds of the leaders of all underdeveloped countries, particularly those which until recently have been ruled by Western colonial powers. Some American commentators, including a few who in the past had advocated a “liberal” attitude toward self-determination of nations, have sharply criticized Nasser for invoking these concepts, which in their opinion do not correspond to the realities of the current world situation.

In their preoccupation with the possible consequences of the Suez crisis, they tend to forget that the great Western powers achieved their present cohesiveness by becoming nation states, and even today are not prepared to accept limitations on their own sovereignty. It is apparently very difficult for Westerners, with a few notable exceptions, to put themselves in the position of non-Western peoples, who are only now arriving at the stage of national development which the French and British attained under great—and

empire-minded—rulers like Queen Elizabeth or Louis XIV.

To say that Western “colonialism” is now in “liquidation” does not salve the feelings of those who have experienced it in their own lifetime and whose emotional antennae are still attuned to the possibility that new forms of infringement on what they regard as their sovereign rights may be in the making. If the West is to reach understandings with non-Western peoples it will have to be more sensitive than at present to their fears and hopes. It will also have to abandon the attitude which, according to Sir John Glubb, former commander of the Arab Legion in Jordan, is the greatest weakness of Westerners in the Middle East—the attitude of “superciliousness,” of feeling that only Westerners can be trusted to operate undertakings involving knowledge of modern technology, like the canal, or to fulfill international agreements.

Emotions in West

But the West, too, is affected by emotions. The initial reaction in Britain and France about the canal was not to seek a reasoned discussion in the United Nations of the rights and wrongs of Nasser’s move, but to invoke the use of force and then, as an alternative, to call a conference whose members were selected by the West and held in London, capital of the nation which for over 70 years, until final evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal zone in 1956, had exercised sway over Egypt. Neither of these reactions was calculated to create in Cairo an atmosphere conducive to reasoned discussion.

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Iraq's Reconstruction: Promise and Problems

by Georgiana G. Stevens

Mrs. Stevens, a journalist who has lived and worked in the Middle East, has made a special study of Iraq, which she visited in the spring of 1956. She has written on this and related topics for the *Middle East Journal* and the *FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN*.

The celebration of Iraq Development Week for the first time in April, 1956, signaled the completion of two major flood-control works on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and the opening of two important bridges linking sections of a projected highway system in the Middle Euphrates tribal region. The celebration itself was noteworthy for the enthusiasm with which the local tribes in this rural section of the country turned out and for the unaccustomed welcome they gave the representatives of the central government from distant Baghdad. Beyond this, the occasion was important for a less spectacular reason. It marked the beginning of a new and complex phase in the country's reconstruction program.

The first phase, started when the Iraq Development Board was established six years ago, required concentration on the essential dams and diversions which now protect the country from disastrous annual floods. Closely connected with these is the reclamation program, designed to restore fertility to some 6 million of Iraq's 19 million acres of potentially cultivable land. Essentially the board's work and the greater part of its first \$155 million allocations during the first years has gone into river-basin work. Roads and buildings have been started, but by comparison they have absorbed a minor proportion of effort and funds.

The second phase of development now under way involves the people of the country directly and confronts the Iraqis with the first general test

of the ability of a largely illiterate and unskilled population to make use of the new opportunities offered by physical restoration of the country. In this phase human reconstruction rather than engineering is beginning to claim priority. The means being taken by Iraqis to reorganize their educational system and to establish new patterns of community effort are both an example and a warning of the difficulties created by rapid development in long-neglected areas of Asia.

Iraq's Assets

Iraq started its reconstruction with many assets. The country is underpopulated. Its two great rivers assure ample irrigated land and power resources. It enjoys an income from oil alone of some \$200 million a year. It has an outlet to the sea at Basra on the Persian Gulf. Its 5 million people include a stimulating mixture of Arabs, Kurds, Christians and many smaller groups, of whom the 4,000 Jews remaining in the country form an important middle-class element.

The people of Iraq are highly intelligent, receptive to ideas and proudly conscious of their great cultural inheritance from the gifted and energetic races who dominated ancient Mesopotamia. It was in their historic tradition to determine, as they did by law in 1950, that two-thirds of their oil wealth should be reserved for reconstruction of their country. In the same forward-looking spirit, the Iraqi government now allots 65 percent of its annual general

budget to education and welfare.

Offsetting some of these advantages is the severe humid climate with its debilitating effect on health and energies, an overcentralized political structure, and a vestigial social order based on highly concentrated ownership of land.

New Economic Man Needed

These disadvantages have now become the subject of increasing anxiety and agitated debate within the country. For, with the main structure of its physical reconstruction in sight, Iraq's planners have come to see that a new sort of economic man is needed. Thus the complex river-control system, which this year has already saved Iraq from one of its classic floods, must be manned by mechanically skilled operators. Newly cultivable state lands now being distributed to individual peasants require an almost complete reorganization of rural life. Canals which bring water to parched lands also bring increased malaria unless they are designed and managed in coordination with preventive measures beyond the understanding of the peasants.

Education and public health, administrative and land reforms are coming to be recognized as necessary ingredients of national development. Their importance is no longer an abstract matter. They have become economic and political necessities.

The lack of trained heads and hands was not so generally apparent in the early postwar years of planning for economic development. Ten

years ago Iraqi leaders were taking stock of their resources, laying the groundwork for establishing the first Development Board in the Middle East. Some of the more farsighted leaders proposed legislation for taxation of land, to speed a basic change in archaic landholding practices. Others were leading the movement for improving the terms of their oil agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company—the international group which operates Iraq's rich oil fields. All of this groundwork began to show results in 1950, when the Development Board was established, and in 1951, when the first 50-50 profit-sharing agreement with the company was signed.

One Change Leads to Another

It was natural that the initial work of the Development Board should have been focused on control of the floods which have ravaged Iraq for years. In this work of river management and reclamation it was natural, too, to employ the most skilled experts from abroad. There was nothing invidious in inviting British, American, French and German engineers to plan and build the intricate barrages and canals at Samarra on the Tigris and Ramadi on the Euphrates. In the construction phases of these works the existing pool of unskilled labor in Iraq played a large and vital role.

But with the completion of construction it has become starkly apparent that there are not going to be enough Iraqis trained to carry on the housekeeping and skilled-labor functions called for in maintenance and operation. Here the Iraqis are confronted with their first obvious lag in planning and execution. The remedy—technical education on the job for adults and increased schooling for the young—calls for complete reorganization of the school system.

Such a reorganization, on which the government is now embarked, requires, in turn, a complete change in the Arab attitude toward education.

Traditionally, education in Arab countries is a pursuit reserved for the elite. Medicine and law carry high prestige value; technical training does not. Iraqi efforts to raise the literacy rate have been directed chiefly at satisfying this accepted standard. Within this frame of reference there has been marked progress. From a school population of 6,000 in 1913, in Ottoman days, enrollment rose to 35,000 in 1931, under Britain's League of Nations mandate. Since Iraq attained independence in 1932, enrollment has increased to about a quarter of a million today. But of these students, an extremely small proportion obtain or aspire to technical training. Three government technical schools have been graduating an average of 50 boys a year for the past ten years. Of the seven higher colleges for men, the Engineering College of Baghdad is the only one training engineers. Another 1,000 Iraqi boys go abroad for technical training on government scholarships, with the commitment to return for four years of government service.

Impact of Foreign Aid

All of this effort to solve the problem produces only a few hundred engineers each year where thousands are needed. As one sympathetic observer has pointed out, Iraq is attempting to salvage the same amount of land, 6 million acres, as was reclaimed in the United States between 1903 and 1950. The United States program utilized the combined efforts of 6,000 engineers. Thus for some time to come the Iraqi program must continue to rely on foreign meteorologists, hydrologists, soil experts and irrigation engineers.

Meanwhile, much of the foreign technical assistance in Iraq is aimed at speeding practical training in rural areas. United States, British and UN missions are providing teachers, public-health instructors and extension services in regions where new settlers on government land are making a first start on their own. A national rural-life improvement program, initiated last year by the Ministry of Social Welfare, is attempting to do for Iraq what India is already doing to encourage successful resettlement of peasants on government land.

The figures on land distribution in Iraq show that some 15,000 Iraqi farmers have shared in the distribution of half a million acres of government land. An attempt is being made to heed the mistakes of Iraq's first land-settlement scheme in Du-jaila, and to see that the traditional functions of the landlord are replaced in government settlements by extension services, credit facilities and cooperative machinery and marketing arrangements. Scientific drainage of reclaimed lands to prevent salinity is another new and heavy responsibility of the government in resettled areas.

Closely allied to this stepped-up program of rural assistance is an expanded road-building and housing program in the provinces. Under the spur of political unrest, demonstrated with disturbing frequency in some provincial areas, Iraq's planners are turning to projects that show quick results. Some \$77 million is being allocated to roads and bridges in the next five years, with priority for roads that will enable farmers to reach markets. A similar emphasis on welfare is found in the figures allocating \$52 million to rural schools and dispensaries and another \$24 million to housing. A contract has just been signed with a Greek consulting firm to direct and supervise

the public housing program.

It is to the credit of Iraq's more enlightened leaders, however, that they realize the limited value of such material measures in rebuilding the country. In Iraq there is fortunately little sense of complacency over the continuing disparity of living standards between rich and poor. There is rather a sense of urgency about more serious reforms of the country's political and social life. For just at the same time that the complexity of physical and material progress has begun to strain Iraq's administrative and professional resources, the country is confronted with even more fundamental internal issues.

Two Internal Lags

It is these issues, rather than the disposal of its capital wealth, which divide the country almost visibly today and make the success of the development program problematical. Up to now the ruling elite, the large landowners and urban professionals, led by veteran statesman Nuri es Said, have met popular demands for reform by well-directed measures of physical improvement. The pattern of these improvements has been sound, and the immediate local amenities being distributed about the country will have a palliative effect as well. To this extent a sense of responsibility and reality dominates even conservative thinking in Baghdad. Public funds are publicly accountable. Iraq is almost alone among oil-rich countries of the region in having a ruling house which sets an example of self-restraint in money matters. Young King Feisal draws only \$168,000 a year for his household out of a total Iraqi income of some \$300 million a year.

The lags in Iraq are found elsewhere. One is in the lack of taxation on land, which makes it possible for large landowners to retain their grip

on the country's basic agricultural economy. Every improvement in irrigation and drainage carried out at public expense only increases the value of private lands. The spectacle of such continuing private enrichment, with freedom from taxation, is one of the causes of chronic unrest in provinces which depend entirely on farming for a living.

Showing its awareness of this issue, the government has recently requested the United States to send tax advisers on a new internal tax program. The time of decision in this field is therefore approaching. It may



Courtesy of The New York Times

be crucial for Iraq if the Parliament in Baghdad, traditionally a stronghold of the landlords, fails to heed the signs of the times and evades once more the tax reforms demanded by public opinion.

The second fundamental lag which threatens the entire future of Iraq is in the overcentralized government organization. All signs indicate that the government of Nuri es Said cannot postpone much longer a revision in favor of a more modern and decentralized system. The crux of the trouble here is the exclusive character of control, centered in a few hands in the nation's capital. As a result, even trivial decisions must be referred to Baghdad ministries. Administrative appointments frequently reflect a preference for

patronage and nepotism rather than recognition of the skills required of a true civil service. The needs and views of provincial and minority elements receive scant attention in this close political family atmosphere. As a result, many of Iraq's ablest trained men remain disenfranchised while the Old Guard struggles with unfamiliar new problems. This exclusion affects even technical graduates returning from abroad, many of whom fail to find places in government service.

In this failure to mobilize all hands and to unleash all the patriotic energies within the country, the present government exhibits its most serious weakness. The important question is whether this will prove to be a fateful weakness, or whether Iraq's brilliant and skillful hierarchy will accept the challenge to their trusteeship as a sign of awakening constructive forces which, if properly harnessed, could assure the fulfillment of Iraq's great promise.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Stanley John Habermann, "Iraq Development Board: Administration and Program," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1955), pp. 179-186; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952); "Iraq," *Focus*, Vol. IV, No. 5 (January 1954); Sir James Arthur Salter, *Development of Iraq: A Plan of Action* (London, Caxton, 1955).

FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON MIDDLE EAST

A valuable background volume is *Mid-East: World Center, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, planned and edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York, Harper, 1956, \$6.50), which contains a series of essays by distinguished authorities on Middle Eastern problems. Of particular current interest are the essays on political institutions (George Lenczowski), economic and social conditions (Charles Issawi), nationalism and imperialism (Hans Kohn), and communism and Islam (Bernard Lewis). In *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (New York, Praeger, 1956, \$6.50), William Z. Laqueur, editor of the bulletin, *Soviet Culture*, sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, presents an exceptionally well-informed and balanced survey on a timely subject.

Spotlight

(Continued from page 12)

sions. Both gave the impression—not only in Cairo but in other capitals as well—that London and Paris were ready to force some kind of settlement on Egypt, and both made eventual recourse to the UN more difficult for the parties to the controversy.

British and French spokesmen, in demanding firm action about Suez, have stressed the life-and-death dependence of their countries on the continued flow of Middle East oil through the canal and their distrust of Nasser's administration of Suez traffic. Yet three questions have arisen about this argument. First, the *London Financial Times*, which cannot be accused of anti-British sentiments, estimates that a 13 percent increase in tanker tonnage could within six months bypass the canal altogether; meanwhile increased oil supplies from the United States and the Caribbean area could replace oil passing through the canal—provided Washington is willing to supply the dollars necessary for these oil purchases. Second, Britain and France, by encouraging the Suez Canal Company, a private firm, to recall British and French pilots from the canal (their number was 114 out of a total of 205), with substantial compensation in salaries and pensions, indi-

cated that they were more interested in inflicting damage on Nasser than in assuring for their own nations the oil supply whose importance they had previously stressed. And, third, the apparent belief of Sir Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet that only drastic action in the case of Nasser can prevent future nationalization of Middle East oil fields by other Arab leaders may prove to be a boomerang; for the picture presented by Sir Anthony of the Western Big Three dictating a settlement to the head of a small and weak nation can only confirm the belief of non-Westerners that the days of "colonialism" are far from past.

By adopting this posture, too, the Western nations are directly playing into the hands of the U.S.S.R. The very phrase "users' association" strengthens the Marxist argument that the advanced industrial nations, when their interests are at stake, are ready to ride roughshod over the interests of the underdeveloped and therefore technologically weaker peoples.

The Suez crisis spotlights the over-all need for profound adjustments by both sides to a changed situation. The West cannot expect, as in the past, to impose unilateral decisions on non-Western nations on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; it must deal with them as equals. The non-Western peoples, for their part, will

have to recognize that the Western nations, too, have interests in their geographic areas which must be taken into consideration. But they cannot be made to do this if subjected to threats which recall to them the worst days of colonial rule. Hitherto, the moral strength of the West was based on the fact that the U.S.S.R. and Communist China were using arbitrary and violent methods to achieve their objectives on the world scene. This moral strength could be easily destroyed by such devices as the West has tried to use in the Suez crisis.

The choice is not between complete surrender by Nasser, which Britain and France appear to seek, and resort to war. Other approaches which might ease the emotions now at high pitch in Cairo and the West remain to be explored—and should be explored in the UN. For while the UN cannot of itself settle the Suez crisis—the UN can only be as strong as its members permit it to be—it provides the opportunity to develop the habits and methods of common action for the common welfare which have been developed over centuries within nation-states and are urgently needed today in the community of increasingly interdependent nations.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(For previous articles on the Suez crisis, see the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN issues of September 1 and 15.)

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